The book examines the global institutional responses to the peace movement demands after the Cold War. Then, instead of the usual-and flawed at best-heroic discussions of victories of global civil society in relation to the establishment of regimes, rise of moral International Relations, and supposed progressivist teleology, a more complex picture with many contradictions, artefacts, and their layering inside and about those regimes looms large.
The main contribution to the topic is the application of the power-analytical framework specifically developed to suit an analysis of formation and workings of global prohibition regimes, including heterarchy-of-power discussion of the relationship between states and non-state actors. The ascent of the model to the arena traditionally dominated by power interests of major powers and ossified lowest-common denominator consensus was confirmed in 2008 when cluster munitions (CMs) were prohibited in a very similar fashion (''The Oslo Process''). Consequently, a humanitarian disarmament model emerged, consisting in bypassing permanent arms-control fora (''The Ottawa Pro-cess''). The ban of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) in 1997 marked a significant shift in humanitarian disarmament. Empirically, two potent humanitarian prohibition regimes that have been formed during the last two decades are examined. In doing so, it utilizes a power-analytical framework and puts in use four conceptions of power: productive, structural, institutional, and compulsory.
This article offers a novel understanding and theorization of humanitarian disarmament regimes and their related prohibition politics. The paper's aims are thus threefold: to advance the systematic comparative analysis of processes of weapons regulation to provide a systematic, theory-led appraisal of the current efforts to regulate LAWS and to arrive at policy recommendations regarding the nascent LAWS norm-setting process. In a third and final step, we apply the insights from these analyses to the case of autonomy in weapon systems, and, by exploring commonalities and differences, evaluate the prospects for regulating LAWS. Secondly, this framework is empirically validated in two case studies on CCW weapon regulation attempts: blinding laser weapons and anti-personnel landmines. It does so by, first, identifying conditions of success and failure in theories of international norm adoption, and by implementing theory-based criteria in a novel analytical framework consisting of, inter alia, issue-specific, actor-specific, and institution-specific features. To contribute to this ongoing discussion, the paper assesses the chances for the adoption of a legally binding instrument regulating (the use of) LAWS within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Whether and how Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) can and should be regulated is intensely debated between governments, campaigners and scholars.
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